But for the Necessary, the way the world is cannot be the low point. After all, they will insist, there must be a reason, an explanation, why the world is the way it is and not otherwise. For example, it cannot simply be that all electrons, trillions and trillions of them, all carry the same electric charge as each other – that would be a cosmic coincidence of unimaginable improbability. No, it`s not a coincidence. The identity of the electric charge derives from the fact that there is a law of nature that states that electrons have this charge. Natural laws “rule” the world. The laws of physics, which describe, for example, the behavior of diffraction gratings (see Harrison), have been true since time immemorial, and it is because of these laws that diffraction gratings, when developed in modern times, have the special properties they have. This is very different from people who believed in multiple gods, each influencing the universe by their own mood or temperament. In polytheistic societies, gods were inconsistent and inscrutable, and nature was ruled by gods who could not be recognized. The universe, they thought, behaved as mysteriously as their gods, without thinking that it could be otherwise. The concept of a findable, intelligent, orderly, rational and predictable universe was simply not in their worldview. Optimization gives the laws of nature a decidedly human taste. It`s the physicists who decide what`s best, and they may disagree.
But as Loewer points out, the flesh of theory is objective because it must accurately describe what nature does. Any theory that doesn`t tell you to run when you see a piano rushing towards you from the tenth floor will be immediately dismissed. The other possibility is that natural laws do not need a legislator. Let us suppose that the laws of nature have always been there, or that they are derived from other laws that have always been there. In this case, the fact that there are natural laws gives us no reason to believe that God exists. The tarsician relationship forming truth exists between events or states on the one hand and the properties of abstract entities (propositions) on the other. As difficult as it may be to absorb such a concept, it is much more difficult to look at a truth-forming relationship “backwards.” Necessitarianism requires us to imagine that a certain privileged class of sentences imposes its truth on events and conditions. Not only is this monumental curiosity of necessitarianism almost never noticed, but no one has ever tried to offer a theory about its nature. Other aspects of the systemic approach make philosophers suspicious. (See in particular Armstrong 1983, 66-73; van Fraassen 1989, 40-64; Carroll 1990, 197-206.) Some argue that this approach will have the unpleasant consequence that laws are unduly dependent on the mind because of the report`s attraction to the concepts of simplicity, strength, and better balance, concepts whose instantiation seems to depend on cognitive abilities, interests, and goals. The call for simplicity raises further questions arising from the obvious need for regulated language to allow reasonable comparisons of systems (Lewis, 1983, 367).
More recently, Roberts has questioned the systems approach to a point sometimes seen as a force of view: “We are not in the habit of balancing the competing virtues of simplicity and informational content in order to choose one deductive system over others where everything is assumed to be true” (2008, 10). There is the practice of curve adjustment, where the competing virtues of simplicity and proximity of fit are weighed, but it is a practice that is part of the process of discovering what is true. The systemic approach is also inappropriate for excluding laws that are widespread and visible as laws, even those that are clearly determined by the original conditions. That the universe is closed, that entropy generally increases, that the planets in our solar system are coplanar, and that others (if true) could be added to any true deductive system, greatly increasing the strength of the system, with little cost in terms of simplicity (Maudlin 2007, 16; Roberts, 2008, p. 23). It is interesting to note that the vision of the system is sometimes abandoned because it satisfies the largely humean constraints of the laws of nature; Some argue that generalizations are laws are not determined by the local affairs of certain facts. (See Section 4 below.) Although Humes, like Lewis, generally favors realism over any form of antirealism (section 5 below), Berenstain and Ladyman (2012) have argued that scientific realism is incompatible with humor because realism requires a notion of natural necessity that is not susceptible to analysis by Humee. For 4 to be a prime number, it would take more than just a violation of the laws of nature.
The question behind scientific efforts is legitimate. Why is the universe ordered? For many physicists, cosmologists and biologists who laid the foundations of modern science, there was a clear answer: there is one Creator of all things, who is the rational and loving God, who constantly reveals Himself to humanity and sustains the universe with His own power.10 What all the different laws have in common, Despite their diversity, it is necessary to: let everything obey them. It is impossible for them to be broken. An object must obey the laws of nature. In this respect, a law of nature differs from the fact that all the gold cubes are smaller than a cubic mile, from the fact that all the apples currently hanging on my apple tree are ripe and other so-called “accidents”. Although this fact about gold cubes is as universal, general and invariably as any law, it is not necessary. This could have been wrong. It is not inevitable or inevitable that all gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile. It turns out that`s true. Curiosity goes even further. Since what it means to be physically impossible is logically incompatible with a law of nature, then any false existential statement such as “A certain S is P” or “There is an S which is a P” would prove not only false, but physically impossible.
Although there are many problems in Tarski`s theory of truth (i.e. the semantic theory of truth, also called “truth correspondence theory”), it is the best theory we have. Its basic concept is that statements (or statements) are true if they describe the world as it is, and they are otherwise false. Metaphorically speaking, we can say that truth stems from the way the world is to statements. Theses “remove their truth” from the world; They do not impose their truth on the world. If Tom says two days before an election, “Sylvia will win”, and two days after the election, Marcus says “Sylvia won”, then it depends on whether Sylvia is elected or not, whether these statements are true or false. If so, both statements are true; If not, both statements are false. But the truth or falsehood of these statements does not make him win (or lose) the election or make him win (or lose) the election.